Social Change and Social Stratification in a Turkish Village

by

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The aim of this paper is to illustrate and critically discuss the effect of social change on rural stratification in Turkey by means of a case study. The rural village under consideration is named Sakarya and is situated 90 kms. S.W. of Ankara in the heart of the grain-farming area of the Anatolian plateau, which is now dominated by mechanized, capital intensive wheat cultivation. One of the advantages of focusing on this particular case, is that it belongs to an area the subsistence or near-subsistence stage of which has been researched in great detail [Stirling, 1965; Cuisenier, 1967; Berkes, 1942], thus providing easier access to a baseline in reference to which contemporary transformations in the stratification system become intelligible. Also, Sakarya is typical of small landownership villages which according to a survey conducted by the State Planning Office in 1968 cover 40 per cent of the rural population, so that the structural changes it has undergone are typical of a large section of rural Turkey.

1. Introduction

In Turkish society, as in many other parts of the world, an unmistakable process of rural change is under way involving the ‘depeasantizing’ of the traditional small producer on land, the creation of ‘quasi-peasant’ rural types and of farming as an occupational category [Wolf, 1966; Geertz, 1961; Shanin, 1966]. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, processes of rural change already under way culminated in irreversible structural changes in the period after 1949-50 during the term in power of the Democratic Party, the agrarian policy of which has contributed considerably to these changes [Robinson, 1965]. Although farm mechanization is but one limited aspect of rural change it will receive selective attention since the area under consideration has been heavily affected by the consequences of unplanned mass mechanization in Turkey. Mechanization has enabled farmers to increase their cropland where available, to accomplish farmwork at proper times, to increase yields considerably as well as enlarge average holding size [Faculty of Political Science Survey, 1953]. However, this rapidly led to an overextension of the area of cultiva-

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tion with negative side-effects for small farmers [E. and A. Hirsch, 1963]. There was a general shift in land tenure and share-cropping practices, leading to an increase of seasonal and wage-labour, to underemployment due to mechanization and consequent rural-urban migration [Robinson, 1952 and 1958].

The process of rural change is undoubtedly advancing at different speeds and taking different forms according to regional, geographical and historical characteristics. In large landownership areas, the transformation of the former feudal landlord into a modern capitalist farmer, and of sharecroppers into wage-workers is already well under way [Kiray and Hinderink, 1970]. In labour intensive, non-mechanized cash-crop areas the small producer develops new kinds of organic links with town merchants, in the absence of any organized credit and marketing organization [Kiray, 1964 and 1968]. In areas where land is more or less evenly distributed among small peasant proprietors, which is characteristic of most Anatolian plateau villages, the passage to modern farm technology and production for the market is accompanied by a tendency for the concentration or polarization of land resources in the hands of rising medium and large landholders, producing deep modifications in the village stratification system [Kandiyoti, 1971]. Sakarya which at its foundation was a grain-growing, subsistence village has gone through different stages since the introduction of farm mechanization which led to its present system of stratification. The material presented here was collected during a field-trip conducted between August 1969 and July 1970, involving participant observation and a survey covering the total adult male population living in the village. Before going into the details of village stratification, it will be useful to provide a brief historical account of social change in Sakarya.

2. Social Change in Sakarya

Sakarya was founded in 1905 by settled migrants under a settlement scheme for nomads and migrants during the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamit. The settlers were given equal plots of land and started their life in Sakarya as sedentary grain farmers and animal husbanders. Sedentary farming not being the rule in the region at the time of their settlement, land was plentiful and Sakarya villagers opened up new land for cultivation as far as their man and animal power permitted, despite frequent border fights and conflicts over right of pasture with their semi-nomadic neighbours.

All villagers were wheat cultivators with little conspicuous differences in income. About 8-10 households were known to have larger plots of land. However, sharecropping was not commonly resorted to and production relied on family labour only. The traditional domestic cycle of the village household was the prime determinant of accumulation and distribution. A well-known feature of the Turkish village is this domestic cycle involving wealth dispersion
after the father's death among sons who divide property equally among themselves and reaccumulation in the individual households of sons which in turn go through a phase of joint patrilocality until further division through inheritance occurs [Stirling, 1963].

The limits set by the operation of this domestic cycle, together with the severe limitations introduced by the use of primitive technology perpetuated a stable and seemingly unchanging social system which could not be usefully approached in terms of stratification as we understand it within the present context. To this, we must add the physical and economic isolation of the village community. Production for the market was more than erratic, with frequent retreat into subsistence and occasional years of severe hardship bordering on famine. After the establishment of the Office of Soil Products in 1938 any excess wheat was sold there at the government fixed price. The dirt road leading to Polatli, the nearest commercial and administrative centre, offered only seasonal and difficult passage.

It is against this background that tractors made their entrance into Sakarya in 1950. The Government offered the villagers credit after the first instalment was paid and the prices were very low indeed. An estimated 5—7 tractors were bought within the two following years, both by villagers with sufficient individual resources and others pooling their resources together to form partnerships. An immediate result of mechanization was that the village reached its cultivable limits. Although there are no reliable demographic figures it can also be assumed that population pressure on land was increasing, in addition to which holdings were generally very fragmented through inheritance. Land shortage in the village coupled with the great speeding up of production started a 'rush for land' and mechanized villagers moved further and further south into the plain of Konya in search of land tenancy. Sakarya villagers seem to have been relatively early adopters of mechanization in the Polatli region. As such they had an initial advantage over neighbouring villages who let them plough their land freely at first for the simple privilege of having it opened to cultivation. This, however, was very short-lived and rapidly left its place to contractual tenancy, involving the payment of an agreed-upon sum to the landowner (icar), or to forms of partnership involving sharing between the landowner and the tractor owner (ortakcilik). As land value rose and mechanization spread, the terms of land tenancy got more and more unfavourable. While labour constituted the major limiting factor in the pre-mechanized period, land took on the most critical role after mechanization so that those peasants who had started out with sufficient capital and land resources prospered, while most were either unable to carry on in the face of mechanized competition or unable to meet the ever increasing cost of tractor maintenance under the pressure to pay debts. In the face of new pressures, small landowners increasingly had to supplement their income from land
by other additional sources such as wage-labour. Among such small landowners a new form of rent or icer appeared; they started to let their land out to mechanized farmers who thus optimized their larger landholdings. In this way, smaller landowners secured a fixed income from land rent to which they added earnings from wage-work. Thus despite their reluctance to actually sell land, an increasing number of villagers were being pushed into a marginal category.

After 1956 economic inflation at a national level made its impact on the village by making it increasingly difficult to meet land and production costs even by the relatively well-off. It is from this period onward that land ceased to be the sole factor in the economic consolidation of village households and that new types of adaptation started appearing. Some households where the father had enough capital resources to finance some new business for himself or his sons diversified their activities by engaging in commerce and transportation, thus also using the extra labour potential of the household created by agricultural underemployment. The profits of these diverse pursuits could ultimately be used to stimulate agricultural production by providing the necessary capital to rent or even purchase land and meet production costs. As a case in point, one could mention a household where the father established himself as a wheat merchant in Polatli while two of his sons are in charge of the land in the village and two others work as truck drivers for the father’s firm, also doing some transportation on the side. Some households formed a partnership and set up a dairy firm; they sell their products on the Polatli market and also serve as middlemen buying up milk and eggs in neighbouring villages and reselling on the town market. These commercial activities led to the creation of new types of village households which despite their residually nuclear composition, link paternal and fraternal households by complex economic links, sometimes cutting across the boundaries of village and town and functioning somewhat like a family firm. We shall hereafter refer to this adaptation as the ‘common income’ household. Finally, some wealthy households did not diversify their activities but either periodically moved out in search of cheaper land or sometimes formed partnerships with merchants in town to share in the financing of production.

While larger and wealthier landowning households consolidated their position by acquiring commercial capital alongside their landed wealth, a very different career started for small landowners. A whole spectrum ran from those who used side occupations to supplement their income from land to those who used land income as a mere addition to the bulk of their earnings in other occupations. According to the 1965 Village Inventory, 29 per cent of households were totally landless and had to rely entirely on the wages of their members. The activities of the Land Distribution Commission in 1967, which left only 4 totally landless households in the village,
did not change the objective condition of villagers to any great extent since they were still dependent on outside mechanical help, still had to rely heavily on subsidiary income sources and remained indebted. Land was distributed to all villagers considered to be sub-marginal, namely all those owning less than 175 dunams which was estimated by the Commission as the minimal norm to keep a family of five on Sakarya land. All married men were eligible so long as they had not sold any land before, lived in the village permanently and would cultivate the land themselves. This meant that the married sons of wealthy households qualified as landless during the lifetime of the household head, since he is the only holder of land rights. Meanwhile, those villagers who had to sell some of their land through necessity could not benefit from the distribution. The condition of having to cultivate one’s own land was no doubt meant to discourage absenteeism, but in the case of non-mechanized small landowners who could rely on additional land income only through renting out their land, this meant additional difficulties. Those have had to resort to hiring mechanical help. If we add to the above the fact that the government-owned land which was the subject of distribution by the Commission was already occupied and cultivated by some villagers although they had no legal rights over it, we can easily see that the distribution process generated more problems than it solved.

The problems and tensions generated by this context found expression in organizational change, with a grass-roots initiative on the part of a group of villagers to found a Co-operative as a response to the growing vulnerability of small producers. On the one hand the aim was to make them less vulnerable to internal pressures to let out their land and engage in unfavourable deals in terms of land rent by providing a Co-operative tractor which could be used by the members at running cost. On the other, it was to protect them from external pressures to sell at low harvest prices in order to settle debts with merchants. Headman elections were fought over the Co-operative issues and were won by the Co-operative faction rather narrowly. Understandably, there was a good deal of opposition from villagers who relied on land tenancy from non-mechanized small producers and who provided other expensive services (such as the transportation of winter coal) now met by the Co-operative. More interesting, however, was the opposition of villagers who although in a position to benefit from the Co-operative could not extricate themselves from multiple obligations to the first group. The Co-operative could not achieve its aims. Both internal opposition and the difficulty of raising sufficient credit forced it to restrict its activities to a minimum. The fact that there was no government policy or actual commitment to support such Co-operatives meant that credit was very difficult to obtain, despite energetic management. This lack of financial backing combined with internal opposition, which was
given free reign, had a crippling effect. It is interesting to note that while mechanization was readily adopted, the Co-operative which aimed at a reorganization of production could not be absorbed into the village and met resistance from the pre-existing structure of economic relationships. The relationship between involvement in the Co-operative movement and position within the social stratification of the village will be the subject of further analysis. What should be clear from the above is that in the period between 1950 and today, changes have occurred which have totally undermined traditional household economy and introduced new criteria for stratification.

3. Land, Income and Rank

Land is undoubtedly still the most important source of wealth in the village. The greatest part of the male population state agriculture as their main occupation (62 per cent) and the majority of households derive their main income from land (65 per cent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Households according to their main source of income</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater part of income from land</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater part of income from animal products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater part of income from wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal income from wages and land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater part of income from other sources (commerce, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

However, landownership on its own is not a perfect indicator of socio-economic status. New sources of non-land income constitute one reason for this, but land ownership itself is complicated by at least three crucial factors: the ownership of farm equipment, the terms of cultivation and the ability to enlarge one's holding through land tenancy. At present, 15 households (23 per cent) are able to cultivate their land by their own means. Of these, only 4 own single-household tractors. More currently, farm implements are owned jointly by fraternal and paternal households. Apart from such joint ownership, there are also 5 villagers of non-kin households who have formed a partnership and bought a tractor and truck.
These are small and medium landowners who have applied for credit and pooled their resources; they use their tractor to plough all their respective land as well as custom-plough and rent land whenever possible. Five households which rent out their land on an icar basis belong to the lowest land brackets. By far the most common arrangement now is the hiring of mechanical help and is resorted to by 34 households (53 per cent); of these 17 households now hire the Co-operative tractor most of which had to let out their land in the past. A customary arrangement for wage-workers, in particular tractor drivers, is to use their employer's tractor, the cost being deducted from their pay. Seven households rely either on their employer's tractor or that of wealthier households.

The arrangements described above may be subject to yearly variations. A villager in urgent need of cash may resort to renting his land out against the payment of an immediate sum one year, and hire a tractor and meet production costs in a better year. There is, however, a hierarchy in the desirability of the methods resorted to. The most undesirable alternative is the pawning of land (avanslı icar) on condition that its recovery will be possible after the full payment of the sum loaned. This is rightly considered as a sure way to lose one's land since recovery may become impossible because of a trivial outstanding sum. Renting out land or icar is also regarded as an undesirable practice although there is little real evidence of actual loss of land through it. The best alternative for those who cannot cultivate their own land is the Co-operative tractor which is hired at running cost and works out at a cheaper rate than any other hiring arrangement. However, it can meet the needs of its members only very partially. Also, in some cases, land is so fragmented and scattered that it is hardly possible to make the tractor run economically.

On the whole although efforts are made at extracting the maximum from land at minimum risk and cost, debts and inability to finance production increase vulnerability. Seventy-nine per cent of villagers get credit from the Agricultural Bank to cover their production costs but in many cases cash shortage leads to a misuse of such credit as in the case of villagers selling their seed at lower-than-purchase price for immediate cash. Wealthier villagers are generally on the lookout for such cheap seed and the small landowner having thus parted with his production credit also finds himself unable to cultivate his own land. These types of contingencies account for the fact that landholding size is not always a very reliable indicator. Nonetheless, generally the very terms of cultivation are related to landholding size. The same is true of the ability to optimize holding size. Most households able to cultivate their own land also rent extra land, and the bigger the holding the larger the extra land tends to be. In general terms it may be said that size of landholding is a good indicator of socio-economic
status at the extremes of the spectrum (especially at the higher extreme), while in the low-middle ranges other factors such as the ownership of farm equipment, the terms of cultivation and indebtedness may introduce important variations.

The variations in socio-economic status due to side-occupations and non-agricultural pursuits are even more difficult to assess. A rough estimate of total yearly income was calculated, based on gross returns from land, animals and their produce, commerce, wages and other sources. Production costs and consumption expenditure have not been deducted making for relatively high figures ranging from 5,000 TL and less per annum to 100,000 TL and more.

Apart from land income most villagers (57 per cent) have a small but reliable income from animals and animal products. They keep sheep and cows, sell milk to the dairy and lambs in the spring. Forty-seven per cent have earnings in the form of wages and daily pay. This type of income is less regular because it depends on the availability of work, the length of the work period involved and the number of people able to find employment in a household. Only skilled wage-workers like tractor drivers derive a dependable income from full-time work in the production season. Twenty-five per cent of villagers also have income from various sources such as commerce, motor transportation and custom ploughing. Total yearly income is naturally subject to changes depending on yields at harvest, animals sold, number of persons in a household able to obtain wage-work, etc.

It must be clear from the foregoing that there is no easy way to define socio-economic status in terms of single criteria nor to arrive at a simple description of social stratification. Social change has, if anything, multiplied sources of uncertainty and the number of criteria whereby social position is evaluated. There are now a wide range of factors which must be taken into account. There are size and quality of landholdings, terms of cultivation, ownership and modalities of ownership of farm implements, side occupations and supplementary sources of income, partnerships and associations, degree of indebtedness or solvency to name but a few.

In view of the difficulties involved in compounding a single index taking all economic factors into account, a ranking procedure was resorted to as an additional measure. Five village judges were selected and instructed to rank households according to their overall socio-economic status, taking into account all the possible contingencies mentioned above. This was preceded by a discussion of the sorts of factors that might influence economic standing, in order to eliminate non-relevant criteria. Ranks were thus simply utilised as a convenient alternative to constructing an index taking all the complex criteria of socio-economic standing into account. In this sense, our ranking procedure is an obviously contrived one, which does not pretend to reflect how the actual social ranking process in the village operates. Stirling, in fact, suggests...
that social rank is the combined outcome of aspects of prestige and power, mediated through attributes such as age, wealth, piety, etc. [Stirling, 1953]. These scales involve a weighting of several factors of which wealth is but one component, albeit the most important one. However, in the case of Sakarya which has undergone very rapid social change and a fundamental departure from its traditional system of production a measure of rank was favoured which attempts to deliniate the different social strata created by this transformation. The names of all household heads were written on cards which were sorted out into consecutive piles by the judges, ranking from upper to lower. The rankings of the judges were then compared and each household was assigned the rank which most judges agreed upon. Three major divisions emerged which could justifiably be labelled as strata, and are distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It could be argued that while ranks may delineate homogeneous and distinct groups from the point of view of strict economic standing, these may in fact be heterogeneous with regard to their position in the village productive system. For instance, a landless household of wage-workers, a village teacher and a small landowning household could be grouped together on the basis of similarities in their economic standing. If that were the case, some of the most crucial features of village stratification would be obscured. However, this ranking procedure did not seem to suffer from such serious defects and a close examination of the contents of the strata reveal that, except in the case of the middle stratum, they involve very homogeneous cases.

The upper strata covers households with large or medium landholdings (401-600 dunams on average), high total yearly income (30-50,000 TL on average) owning farm machinery and equipment, whose non-agricultural income, if any, is commercial (as in the case of motor transportation and wheat trade). The lower stratum is also very homogeneous and covers households with very little land, mainly obtained from the Land Distribution Commission (as opposed to inherited land, 0-100 dunams on average), low total yearly income (5-10,000 TL), unable to cultivate land by their own resources and relying heavily on unskilled and rarely skilled wage-work. The same degree of homogeneity cannot be claimed for the middle stratum. It involves small and medium landowners (101-200 dunams on average) who while deriving their major income
from land (10-20,000 TL total yearly income), vary a great deal in their side occupations and have additional income from wage-work, small commercial enterprise or both, in ways which sometimes defy classification. One of the factors accounting for the considerable gap between the lower and middle stratum, setting aside land ownership, is the fact that skilled wage work such as truck, tractor and minibus driving is much more prevalent in the middle stratum whereas lower stratum villagers constitute unskilled labour, which makes their income not only lower but increasingly undependable in view of the spread of farm technology, leaving them in a very marginal category. In fact, middle stratum villages are not only getting more out of their land, because of their larger holdings, but are also getting more from their side occupations. They denote the presence of some small amount of capital enabling the villagers to make an investment. However, it is the very scarcity of capital which also explains the number of partnerships and joint enterprises prevalent in this stratum. Unlike the forms of joint-ownership among kin which are usual in the upper stratum as in the case of the 'common income' households referred to previously, middle stratum partnerships are among non-kin households pooling their credit and resources together. Such is the case of 5 villagers who own a tractor and a truck in partnership, taking turns in motor transportation, custom ploughing and renting land jointly whenever possible. There are also cases of joint minibus ownership. The success of this type of enterprise depends greatly on the ability to repay debts fast enough to make investments profitable and is regarded by villagers with a certain amount of scepticism. In the cases referred to above, all the profits were still being used to repay debts. The middle stratum reflects a state of flux and an ongoing process of change in the village; it seems clear that increasing polarisation is still to come, especially in view of the fact that many middle stratum adaptations are quite precarious and are perceived as such by the villagers themselves. It seems likely that a large number of middle stratum villagers will become downwardly mobile and join the ranks of the lower stratum, while a few might develop the entrepreneurial qualities of some upper stratum households.

A point which seems worth noting is that in the case of Sakarya which has intrinsically limited land resources, centrifugal forces operate on the villagers both in the case of economic success and consolidation as in that of economic failure. For wealthier households which start developing entrepreneurial characteristics, consolidation is achieved through the migration to town of a member of the 'common income' household, usually an older member who sets himself up in commerce and maintains ties with younger brothers or sons in the village. Thus the prosperity of such village households can no longer be understood simply in terms of their economic activities within the village. Likewise, lower stratum
villagers who can no longer sustain themselves on village land migrate temporarily or permanently in search of work, although in this case it is younger members of a household who move out; this type of movement however does not lead to the consolidation of the village household but rather to its dismantling. It is no accident, therefore, that we see a predominance of nuclear households in the lower stratum as opposed to a greater incidence of 'common income' and patrilocally extended households in the upper stratum. Although both nuclearity and extendedness are but phases of the domestic cycle of village households, the numerical trend is too clearcut to be put on the count of this cycle. Table 2 below shows the relationship between amount of land owned, total yearly income, stratum membership and household membership all of which are very significant.

\[
\text{TABLE 2}
\]

\textit{Correlations between Rank, Size of Landholdings, Total Yearly Income and Household Type}

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Rank (from Lower to Upper)} & \textbf{(1)} & \textbf{(2)} & \textbf{(3)} & \textbf{(4)} \\
\hline
\textbf{Size of landholding} & \textbf{.69} & \textbf{.79} & \textbf{.60} &  \\
\hline
\textbf{Total yearly income} & \textbf{} & \textbf{.71} & \textbf{.41} &  \\
\hline
\textbf{Household type (from nuclear to extended)} & \textbf{.60} & \textbf{.41} & \textbf{.58} &  \\
\hline
\textbf{(γ coefficient)} & \textbf{} & \textbf{.60} & \textbf{.60} & \textbf{.60} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Levels of significance

\[\text{xxx } p < .005\]
\[\text{xxxx } p < .001\]

The post-mechanization village has set the scene for the rise of a new upper stratum of entrepreneurial mechanized farmers, some of whom have become small-town merchants in Polatli, of a new stratum of sub-marginal wage-workers, and a middle stratum of small proprietors, who while still deriving their main livelihood from their land are in an extremely precarious economic position. The
operation of this system of stratification could be made clearer through the analysis of an instance on conflict in the village, generated by the controversial foundation of the village Co-operative.

4. Stratification and Conflict: the Case of the Village Co-op

As was pointed out earlier, the Co-operative came as a response to the growing vulnerability of small producers who constitute the greatest part of Sakarya villagers. Therefore its major appeal and avowed aim was to protect the small producer from unfavourable market conditions, indebtedness and unfair deals in terms of cultivation. As it is, the Co-operative occasioned the first instance of serious factional dispute in the village and also gave rise to the first headman election which was fought on any platform at all. An interesting issue to analyze is whether such conflict followed the lines of the stratification system spelt out above.

The Co-operative was set up by 21 founding members, and there were 13 villagers who joined immediately afterwards. There was in fact a mere trickle of late joiners (8 villagers) and 36 villagers kept out of it altogether. Considering that the major appeal of the Co-operative was to the small landowner, one would normally predict that the lower a villager’s position in the social stratification the more enthusiastic his support and the earlier his membership ought to be. However, there is, if anything, a slight trend in the opposite direction which at first sight seems quite intriguing.

There are several types of factors which can go towards accounting for this state of affairs. First, there is the fact that the aims of the Co-operative are more, or at least as relevant to the needs of the middle stratum as we have described it above, as to that of the lower. A middle-stratum villager, like the tractorless owner of 250 dunams who drives a minibus on the side is just as interested in having his land cultivated by the Co-operative tractor and in buying consumption items cheaply, as the owner of 100 dunams, or less which is grossly insufficient and who might have to rely more heavily on wages. Furthermore, the above mentioned ‘middle’ farmer is much more likely to have preserved a relative independence and not to have contracted links of obligation to wealthier households for the cultivation of his land, for his job or for his debts. This brings us to a further point, namely the fact that the poorest villagers are also those who are most prone to entanglements in land rent, indebtedness and jobs with wealthier village households or individuals outside the village, making it more difficult for them to benefit from the Co-operative. It is not surprising therefore that of the 36 non-members as many as 18 belong to the lower stratum. Three of the staunchest anti-Co-operative villagers have small plots of land which they cultivate with their employer’s tractor. It is less clear how much such villagers can also rely on their employers to help them in times of need. In any event, they seem to maintain closer ties and loyalty to house-
holds they are thus obligated to. The founders and supporters of the Co-operative exhibit considerable variations in socio-economic status but can be characterized as relatively free agents with respect to their income sources and their dependency on land. The first head of the Co-operative was a young man who was a partner in the dairy firm and the member of a well-to-do household. Some upper stratum households who had no immediate interest in the Co-operative likewise lent their support. Typically, these had basically nothing to lose from innovation within the village and acquired political power by acting as innovators and community leaders. Nonetheless, the Co-operative movement has the characteristic of being a middle stratum venture, and as such carries the same characteristics of precariousness as that particular village stratum itself. In effect, it translates the resistance of the small proprietor who is still trying to sustain his enterprise in the village as a viable entity. Given the present set of circumstances, however, there does not seem to be any scope left in Sakarya for that type of enterprise and the Co-operative cannot seriously alter that basic fact itself.

Considering that the changes Sakarya has gone through are quite typical, its stratification system and the particular tensions characteristic of it have wider implications. In this respect, a further task which remains outside the scope of our analysis, is linking the emerging village strata with society as a whole. There have been permanent departures from 60 per cent of village households over a twenty-year period and this out-flow is continuing extending the kin network outside the boundaries of the village. Migrant villagers are becoming integrated in various ways over time to the urban centres which is their new habitat; few have become small-town merchants, most are swelling the ranks of workers in the urban service and industrial sectors. Both horizontal and vertical follow-ups of these different careers seem essential to an understanding of the cumulative effects of rural change, the pace and type of Turkish urbanization and finally Turkish social change as a whole.

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