A PHENOMENOLOGY OF TOURIST EXPERIENCES

Erik Cohen

Abstract Contemporary studies of tourism see the tourist experience as either something essentially spurious and superficial, an extension of an alienated world, or as a serious search for authenticity, an effort to escape from an alienated world. It is argued that neither of these views is universally valid. A more discriminating distinction between five types of tourist experiences is proposed, based on the place and significance of tourist experience in the total world-view of tourists, their relationship to a perceived 'centre' and the location of that centre in relation to the society in which the tourist lives. It is proposed that the resulting continuum of types of tourist experience is both more comprehensive than alternative conceptual frameworks and capable of reconciling and integrating the conflicting interpretations arising from earlier studies.

Introduction

What is the nature of the tourist experience? Is it a trivial, superficial, frivolous pursuit of vicarious, contrived experiences, a 'pseudo-event' as Boorstin (1964: 77-117) would have it, or is it an earnest quest for the authentic, the pilgrimage of modern man, as MacCannell (1973: 593) believes it to be?

Tourists are often seen as 'travellers for pleasure'; however, though sufficient for some purposes, this is a very superficial view of the tourist. The more precise quality and meaning of the touristic experience have seldom been given serious consideration, either in theoretical analysis or in empirical research. Not that we lack controversy - indeed, recently, the nature and meaning of tourism in modern society became the subject of a lively polemic among sociologists and social critics. In one camp of the polemic we find those, like Boorstin (1964) and lately Turner and Ash (1975), for whom tourism is essentially an aberration, a symptom of the malaise of the age. Boorstin bemoans the disappearance of the traveller of old, who was in search of authentic experiences, and despises the shallow modern mass tourist, savoring 'pseudo-events'. The opposing, newer camp is represented primarily by MacCannell; he criticizes the critics, claiming that '... Boorstin only expresses a long-standing touristic attitude, a pronounced dislike ... for other tourists, an attitude that turns man against man in a they-are-the-tourists-I-am-not equation' (MacCannell, 1973: 602). He argues that Boorstin's approach, '... is so prevalent, in fact, (among the tourists themselves as well as among travel writers) that it is a part of the problem of mass tourism, not an analytical reflection on it' (MacCannell, 1973: 600). As in every polemic, however, the protagonists of the opposing views tend to overstate their case. Thus MacCannell, claiming to confute Boorstin's view with empirical evidence, states that 'None of the accounts in my collection (of observations of tourists) support Boorstin's contention that tourists want superficial, contrived experiences. Rather, tourists demand authenticity, just
as Boorstin does' (ibid., p. 600). But, MacCannell himself is very selective in the choice of his observations: his accounts are mostly of young, 'post-modern' (Kavolis, 1970) tourists. Boorstin's thesis may well find more support in a different sample, composed primarily of sedate, middle-class, middle-aged tourists. Hence, even if one admits that Boorstin's claims may be too extreme and that some tourists may indeed be in search of 'authenticity', it nevertheless appears too far-fetched to accept MacCannell's argument that all tourists single-mindedly pursue 'real', authentic experiences, but are denied them by the machinations of a tourist establishment which presents them with staged tourist settings and 'false backs'. The conflict between these contrasting conceptions of tourists remains thus unresolved, as the proponents of each claim to describe 'the tourist' as a general type, while implicitly or explicitly denying the adequacy of the alternative conception.

In my view, neither of the opposing conceptions is universally valid, though each has contributed valuable insights into the motives, behaviour and experiences of some tourists. Different kinds of people may desire different modes of touristic experiences; hence 'the tourist' does not exist as a type. The important point, however, is not merely to prove that both conceptions enjoy some empirical support, though neither is absolutely correct; rather it is to account for the differences within a more general theoretical framework, through which they will be related to, and in turn illuminated by, some broader views of the relationship of modern man to his society and culture. In this paper I shall attempt to do so by examining the place and significance of tourism in a modern person's life; I shall argue that these are derived from his total world-view, and depend especially on the question of whether or not he adheres to a 'centre', and on the location of this 'centre' in relation to the society in which he lives. Phenomenologically distinct modes of touristic experiences are related to different types of relationships which obtain between a person and a variety of 'centres'.

Tourism and the Quest for the Centre

The concept of the 'centre' entered sociological discourse in several overlapping, but not identical fashions. M. Eliade (1971: 12-17) pointed out that every religious 'cosmos' possesses a centre; this is '... pre-eminentely the zone of the sacred, the zone of absolute reality' (ibid., 17). In traditional cosmological images, it is the point where the axis mundi penetrates the earthly sphere, '... the meeting point of heaven, earth and hell' (ibid., 12).

However, the centre is not necessarily geographically central to the life-space of the community of believers; indeed, as Victor Turner has pointed out, its ex-centric location may be meaningful in that it gives direction and structure to the pilgrimage as a sacred journey of spiritual ascension to 'The Center Out There' (Turner, 1973). The 'centre', however, should not be conceived in narrowly religious terms. E. Shils (1975) has argued that every society possesses a 'centre', which is the charismatic nexus of its supreme, ultimate moral values. While Shils does not deal explicitly with the location of the symbolic bearers of the charismatic 'centre', there
is little doubt that he considers the locus of its paramount symbols e.g. the monarch or the crown (Shils & Young, 1953) to be ordinarily within the geographical confines of the society. Shils' concept of the centre was further developed by S. N. Eisenstadt (1968) who distinguishes between multiple 'centres', e.g. political, religious or cultural; in modern society these centres do not necessarily overlap, and their paramount symbols may be differentially located. The individual's 'spiritual' centre, whether religious or cultural, i.e. the centre which for the individual symbolizes ultimate meanings, is the one with which we are concerned in this paper.

Structural-functionalist theory, in particular in the Parsonian variety, assumes as a matter of course that the spiritual centre of the modern individual will be normally located within the confines of his society – he will 'conform' with this society's ultimate values. Such conformity may indeed generate tensions and dissatisfaction. These, however, will be taken care of by the mechanisms of 'pattern maintenance' and 'tension management'. The latter will include various types of leisure and recreational activity in which the individual finds release and relief. Such activities take place in segregated settings, which are not part of 'real' life; in Schutz's phenomenological terminology, they may be called 'finite provinces of meaning' (Berger & Luckman, 1966: 39). Though consisting of activities representing a reversal of those demanded by the central value-nexus (e.g. 'play' as against 'work'), they are 'functional' in relieving the tension built up in the individual and hence reinforce, in the long run, his allegiance to the 'centre'. The individual may need relief from tension, created by the values, but he is not fundamentally alienated from them. Tourism, in the Parsonian scheme, is a recreational activity par excellence: it is a form of temporary getaway from one's centre, but in relation to the individual's biography, his life-plan and aspirations, it remains of peripheral significance. Indeed, in terms of a functional theory of leisure, tourism only remains functional, so long as it does not become central to the individual's life-plan and aspirations – since only so long will it regulate his tensions and dissatisfactions, refreshing and restoring him, without destroying his motivation to perform the tasks of his everyday life. This means that tourism is essentially a temporary reversal of everyday activities – it is a no-work, no-care, no-thrift situation; but it is in itself devoid of deeper meaning: it is a 'vacation', i.e. 'vacant' time. If tourism became central, the individual would become 'deviant', he would be seen as 'retreating', opting-out, or escaping the duties imposed upon him by his society.

The assumption that modern man is normally a conformist, and that he will hence generally adhere to the centre of 'his' society is, to say the least, simplistic. Many moderns are alienated from their society. What about the 'spiritual' centre of such alienated people? Several alternatives can be discerned: (a) some may be so completely alienated as not to look for any centre at all, i.e. not to seek any ultimate locus of meaning; (b) some, aware of what to them looks an irretrievable loss of their centre, seek to experience vicariously the authentic participation in the centre of others, who are as yet less modern and less, in E. Heller's (1961) term, 'disinherited'. (c) some, particularly those whom Kavolis (1970) described as 'post-
modern', often possess a 'decentralized personality', and equivocate between different centres, almost turning the quest into the purpose of their life; (d) finally, some may find that their spiritual centre lies somewhere else, in another society or culture than their own. I argue that within the context of each of these possible types of attitude to the centre, tourism will be endowed with a different significance. In the following I shall develop a phenomenology of modes of touristic experiences and relate them to these alternative forms of relationship between a modern person and various 'centres'.

The Modes of Tourist Experiences

Travelling for pleasure (as opposed to necessity) beyond the boundaries of one's life-space assumes that there is some experience available 'out there', which cannot be found within the life-space, and which makes travel worthwhile. A person who finds relief from tensions within his life space, or does not perceive outside its boundaries any attractions the desire for which he cannot also fulfil at home, will not travel for pleasure.

Risking some over-simplification, I argue that primitive society usually entertained an image of a limited 'cosmos', ideally co-terminous with its life-space, surrounded by a dangerous and threatening chaos. Insofar as the sacred centre was geographically located within the life-space, primitive man had no reason or desire to venture beyond its boundaries. It is only when a powerful mythological imagery locates the 'real' centre in another place, beyond the limits of the empirical world, a 'paradise' beyond the surrounding chaos, that 'paradisiac cults' terminating in large scale voyages, develop (Eliade, 1969, 88-111). This is the original, archaic pilgrimage, the quest for the mythical land of pristine existence, of no evil or suffering, the primaeval centre from which man originally emerged, but eventually lost it. The pilgrimage later on becomes the dominant form of non-instrumental travelling in traditional and particularly peasant societies (Turner, 1973). However, the traditional pilgrimage differs from the archaic in that the pilgrim's goal, the centre, is located within his 'world', but beyond the boundaries of the immediate life-space; this contingency is predicated upon a separation between the limited life-space and his 'world': the image of the latter is vastly expanded and embraces a large number of life-spaces of individual communities or societies. Thus, Jerusalem becomes the centre of the Jewish and Christian 'world', Mecca that of the Muslim 'world'. Traditional pilgrimage is essentially a movement from the prohane periphery towards the sacred centre of the religious 'cosmos'.

Modern mass tourism, however, is predicated upon a different development: the gradual abandonment of the traditional, sacred image of the cosmos, and the awakening of interest in the culture, social life and natural environment of others. In its extreme form, modern tourism involves a generalized interest in or appreciation of that which is different, strange or novel in comparison with what the traveller is acquainted with in his cultural world (Cohen, 1974: 533, 1972: 165). Hence, it leads to a movement away from the spiritual, cultural or even religious
centre of one’s ‘world’, into its periphery, toward the centres of other cultures and societies.

Pilgrimages and modern tourism are thus predicated on different social conceptions of space and contrary views concerning the kind of destinations worth visiting and of their location in the socially constructed space; hence they involve movement in opposite directions: in pilgrimage from the periphery toward the cultural centre, in modern tourism, away from the cultural centre into the periphery.

These differences notwithstanding, the roles of pilgrim and tourist are often combined, particularly in the modern world (Dupont, 1973, Cohen, 1974: 542). The fusion or the role does not, however, mean a fusion of the divergent cognitive structures. MacCannell, who views the tourist as a modern pilgrim (1973: 593), does not expressly discuss the problem of the cognitive structure of the tourist’s ‘world’, in contrast to that of the pilgrim.

Here I shall develop a phenomenological typology of tourist experiences by analysing the different meanings which interest in and appreciation of the culture, social life and the natural environment of others has for the individual traveller. The degree to which his journey represents a ‘quest for the centre’, and the nature of that centre will be at the heart of this analysis. The typology, in turn, relates to different points of continuum of privately constructed ‘worlds’ of individual travellers (not necessarily identical with those prevalent in their culture), ranging between the opposite poles of the conception of space characteristic of modern tourism on the one hand and that of the pilgrimage on the other. I have distinguished five main modes of touristic experiences:

1. The Recreational Mode
2. The Diversionary Mode
3. The Experiential Mode
4. The Experimental Mode
5. The Existential Mode.

These modes are ranked here so that they span the spectrum between the experience of the tourist as the traveller in pursuit of ‘mere’ pleasure in the strange and the novel, to that of the modern pilgrim in quest of meaning at somebody else’s centre. Let us now discuss each in some detail.

1. The Recreational Mode: this is the mode of touristic experiences which a structural-functionalist analysis of society would lead us to expect as typical for modern man. The trip as a recreational experience is a form of entertainment akin in nature to other forms of entertainment such as the cinema, theatre, or television. The tourist ‘enjoys’ his trip, because it restores his physical and mental powers and endows him with a general sense of well-being. As the term ‘recreation’ indicates, even this mode of tourist experience is ultimately and distantly related to and derived from the religious voyage to the sacred, life-endowing centre, which rejuvenates and ‘re-creates’. Indeed, one can follow the process of ‘secularization’
of tourism historically, e.g. in the change from 'thermalists', whose belief in the healing properties of thermal springs was ultimately grounded in mythological images of springs as 'centres' from which supernatural powers penetrate the empirical world, to tourists, who 'take the waters' primarily as a form of high-class socializing (Lowenthal, 1962). Though the belief in the recuperative or restorative power of the tourist trip is preserved, it is a secular, rational belief in the value of leisure activities, change of climate, rest etc.

While the traditional pilgrim is newly born or 're-created' at the centre, the tourist is merely 'recreated'. In the recreational tourist trip, the intent and meaning of the religious voyage is secularized: it loses its deeper, spiritual content. Though the tourist may find his experiences on the trip 'interesting', they are not personally significant. He does not have a deep commitment to travel as a means of self-realization or self-expansion. Like other forms of mass-entertainment, recreational tourism appears from the perspective of 'high' culture as a shallow, superficial, trivial and often frivolous activity, and is ridiculed as such by Boorstin and other cultural critics. A correlate of this view is that the tourist travelling in that mode appears often to be gullible to the extreme (Mitford, 1959), easy to be taken in by blatantly inauthentic or outrightly contrived, commercialized displays of the culture, customs, crafts and even landscapes of the host society. His apparent gullibility, however, ought not to be ascribed solely to his ignorance; rather, he does not really desire or care for the authentic (Huetz de Lemps, 1964: 23); he is 'no stickler for authenticity' (Desai, 1974: 4). Since he seeks recreation, he is quite eager to accept the make-believe and not to question its authenticity; after all one does not need to be convinced of the authenticity of a TV play or a motion picture in order to enjoy it as a recreational, entertaining or relaxing experience.

The recreation-seeking tourist, hence, thrives on what Boorstin (1964) calls 'pseudo-events'. But the depth of contempt in which he is held on that account by intellectuals and 'serious' travellers is misplaced: the tourist gets what he really wants – the pleasure of entertainment, for which authenticity is largely irrelevant. Such recreation-oriented tourists should be looked upon less as shallow, easily gullible simpletons who believe any contraption to be 'real', or as stooges of a prevaricating tourist establishment, but rather as persons who attend a performance or participate in a game; the enjoyability of the occasion is contingent on their willingness to accept the make-believe or half-seriously to delude themselves. In a sense, they are accomplices of the tourist establishment in the production of their own deception. Recreation-oriented tourists like the audience of a play can completely legitimately enjoy themselves despite, or even – as in the case of some of the more outlandish performances of local custom – because, the fact that the experienced is not 'real'; the real thing may be too terrifying or revolting, to be enjoyable. For the recreation-seeking tourist, the people and landscapes he sees and experiences are not part of his 'real' world; like other recreational settings, they are 'finite provinces of meaning' separate from reality, though this is not explicitly admitted by either the tourists or the staff of tourist establishments. Indeed, tourists as well as staff, may be mutually aware of the fact that each is playing a role in order
to upkeep an inauthentic, indeed artificial, but nevertheless enjoyable, ‘construction of (touristic) reality’. If this is openly admitted, the tourist situation would be homologous to that of mass entertainment. The distinguishing trait of the tourist situation, however, is that such an admission would spoil the game.

Tourism as recreation is, in itself, not a ‘serious business’; rather it is an ‘idle pleasure’ (Lowenthal, 1962: 124), and as such had a hard time in gaining recognition as a legitimate reason for travelling. It achieved such legitimation, indeed, not because it is enjoyable in itself, but rather on the strength of its recuperative powers, as a mechanism which recharges the batteries of weary modern man (Glasser, 1975: 19-20), refreshes and restitutes him so he is able again to return to the wear and tear of ‘serious’ living. Such tourism serves as a ‘pressure-valve’ for modern man. When he cannot take the pressures of daily living any more, he goes on a vacation. If he overdoes it, or fails to return to serious living, his behaviour becomes ‘dysfunctional’, in its extreme anomic escapism. But ordinarily it is ‘functional’ because it manages the tensions generated by modern society and hence helps to preserve the adherence of the individual to it – in a similar way in which the Carnival (e.g. Baroja, 1965: 23-4) and other forms of legitimate debauchery, normatively circumscribed in time and place, served as a ‘pressure-valve’ of traditional Christian society. In the functionalist view, recreational tourism is chiefly caused by the ‘push’ of the tourist’s own society, not by the particular ‘pull’ of any place beyond its boundaries. The recreational tourist is primarily ‘getting away’. Hence, he is often equanimous as to the choice of possible destinations for his ‘holiday’, thus providing the advertisement industry with plentiful opportunities to tilt his decision in a variety of competing directions.

Though not serious business in itself, recreation, then performs a serious ‘function’ – it restituates the individual to his society and its values, which, despite the pressures they generate, constitute the centre of his world. Insofar as he is aware of this function and values it, it becomes in an oblique sense, the meaning of his trip. If it were not for the pressures generated in his daily life at home, or if the pressures were resolved by alternative mechanisms, as e.g. they are in traditional societies, he may find no need to travel; he would stay at home. Here we have one of the main reasons for the tremendous upsurge of tourism in modern, and particularly in urban society (Dumazdier, 1967: 125-6): this society generates pressure which it has few means to resolve; peasants, even in modern societies, travel little.

2. The Diversionary Mode: Recreational tourism is a movement away from the centre, which serves eventually to reinforce the adherence to the centre. Hence, it may possess a meaning for the person oriented to that centre.

As we pointed out above, however, modern men are often alienated from the centre of their society or culture. Some of them, may not be seeking alternative centres: their life, strictly speaking, is ‘meaningless’, but they are not looking for meaning, whether in their own society or elsewhere. For such people, travelling in the mode just described, loses its recreational significance: it becomes purely diversionary – a mere escape from the boredom and meaninglessness of routine.
everyday existence, into the forgetfulness of a vacation, which may heal the body and soothe the spirit, but does not ‘recreate’ – i.e. it does not re-establish adherence to a meaningful centre, but only makes alienation endurable. Diversionary tourism is then, in terms of what Glasser calls the ‘Therapy School’ of sociology of leisure, ‘... a healing balm for the robots ...’ It accepts that for most people work will always be emotionally uncommitting and therefore unrewarding, and that they are condemned to seek in their leisure temporary oblivion and comfort for abraded nerve endings ... the Therapy School ... [puts] emphasis on immediate diversion ...’ (Glasser, 1975: 21).

The diversionary mode of tourist experience, hence, is similar to the recreational, except that it is not ‘meaningful’, even in an oblique sense. It is the meaningless pleasure of a centre-less person.

The recreational and diversionary modes of touristic experience have been the target of the savage criticism of tourism by culture critics such as Boorstin (1964) and Turner and Ash (1975). They are apparently characteristic of most mass tourists from modern, industrial urban societies. On this point I tend to agree with Boorstin, rather than with MacCannell. Even then, however, an interesting question remains unresolved: which one of these two modes is the prevalent one? One cannot approach this question without first taking a stand on that most basic problem; how deeply is modern man alienated? Even the critics of tourism may not be unanimous on this question. Hence, even the criticisms may differ: if modern man is conceived of as adhering to a central nexus of Western values, his prevailing mode of travel is recreational; he may then be criticized for his narrow parochialism, his lack of readiness to relate to the values of others except in a superficial, casual manner. If modern man is conceived of as alienated, then his prevailing mode of travel is diversionary; tourism is then criticized primarily as a symptom of the general malaise of modern society.

The two modes of tourism discussed above, however, do not exhaust the field: some tourists, primarily the minority of ‘post-modern’, and other, non-institutionalized types of tourists (Cohen, 1972) indeed derive a deeper meaning from their travels, of the kind MacCannell finds characteristic of tourists in general. The remaining three modes of touristic experience represent different levels of depth of meaning which tourism may possess for the individual.

3. Experiential Mode: the recreational tourist adheres to the centre of his society or culture; the diversionary tourist moves in a centre-less space. But what happens when the disenchanted or alienated individuals become growingly aware of their state of alienation, and the meaninglessness and fatuity of their daily life, as many younger members of the middle classes in the ‘post-modern’ society have become?

One direction which their search for meaning might take is the attempt to transform their society through revolution; another, less radical alternative is to look for meaning in the life of others – tourism (MacCannell, 1976: 3).

The renewed quest for meaning, outside the confines of one’s own society is commenced. in whatever embryonic, unarticulated form, by the search for
‘experiences’; the striving of people who have lost their own centre and are unable
to lead an authentic life at home to recapture meaning by a vicarious, essentially
aesthetic, experience of the authenticity of the life of others (MacCannell, 1973).
This mode of tourism we shall call ‘experiential’.

The ‘experiential’ mode characterizes the tourist as he emerges from
MacCannell’s description. If Boorstin is among the most outspoken critics of
recreational and a fortiori diversionary tourism, which in his view encompass all
modern tourism, MacCannell attempts to endow tourism with a new dignity by
claiming that it is a modern form of the essentially religious quest for authenticity.
But though he puts forward his view of the tourist against that of the ‘intellectuals’
(MacCannell, 1973: 598-601), implying that it holds for ‘the tourist’ in general, it is
clear that his claim is based on a view of modern man who, alienated from the
spiritual centre of his own society, actively, though perhaps inarticulately, searches
for a new meaning. Indeed, MacCannell argues that ‘The concern of moderns for
the shallowness of their lives and inauthenticity of their [everyday] experiences
parallels concern for the sacred in primitive society’ (MacCannell, 1973: 589-90).
Unlike in situations where such shallowness engenders a desire for an internal
spiritual revolution, the modern tourist turns elsewhere for authenticity: ‘The more
the individual sinks into everyday life, the more he is reminded of reality and
authenticity elsewhere’ (MacCannell, 1976: 160). MacCannell claims that
‘Pretension and tachiness generate the belief that somewhere, only not right here,
not right now, perhaps just over there someplace, in another country, in another
life-style, in another social class, perhaps, there is genuine society’ (MacCannell,
1976: 155). Therefore ‘Authentic experiences are believed to be available only to
those moderns who try to break the bonds of their everyday existence and begin to
“live”’ (MacCannell, 1976: 159). The search for authentic experiences is essentially
a religious quest: therefore it follows that ‘... tourism absorbs some of the social
functions of religion in the modern world’ (MacCannell, 1973: 589). However,
since ‘Touristic consciousness is motivated by the desire for authentic experience
...’ (ibid.: 597), rather than trivial ones, the chief problem facing the tourist
becomes ‘... to tell for sure if the experience is authentic or not’. (ibid.: 597). As
against Boorstin and others who maintain that the tourist is content with contrived
experiences, or is a mere superficial stooge, MacCannell endeavours to prove that
the tourist is in fact a serious victim of a sophisticated deception: the tourist
establishment ‘stages authenticity’, so that tourists are misled to believe that
they succeeded in breaking through the contrived ‘front’ of the inauthentic,
and have penetrated into the authentic ‘back’ regions of the host society,
while in fact they were only presented with ‘false backs’, staged by the tourist
establishment, or, in Carter’s (1971) term, ‘fenced in’. The problem is not the
cultural shallowness of the tourists but the sophisticated machinations of the tourist
establishment. However, though critical of the tourist establishment as the
progenitor of a ‘false (touristic) consciousness’ (MacCannell, 1973: 589),
MacCannell is nevertheless convinced of the ‘functional’ importance of tourism.
Indeed, in an admittedly Durkheimian mode, he claims that tourism ‘... is a form
of ritual respect for society’ (MacCannell, 1973: 589) and hence, apparently, reinforces social solidarity. But he probably means ‘Society’ in general (and not necessarily the one of which the tourist is a member), since it was precisely the inauthenticity of life in his own society, coupled with the ‘... reminder (through the availability of souvenirs) of reality and authenticity elsewhere’ (MacCannell, 1976: 160) and the ‘... availability of authentic experiences at other times and in other places’ (ibid.: 148) which motivated the tourist for his quest in the first place. MacCannell likens tourism to the religious pilgrimage: ‘The motive behind a pilgrimage is similar to that behind a tour: both are quests for authentic experiences’ (MacCannell, 1973: 593). But, the similarity he points out notwithstanding, there are some important, and to my mind crucial, differences: first, the pilgrim always undertakes his journey to the spiritual centre of his religion, though that centre may be located far beyond the boundaries of his life-space or society. It is true that the tourist, too, may travel to the artistic, national, religious and other centres of his own society or culture and pay them ‘ritual respect’. But one of the distinguishing characteristics of modern tourism is precisely the generalized interest in the environment, and the desire for experiences far beyond the limits of the traveller’s own cultural realm: indeed, it is often the sheer strangeness and novelty of other landscapes, lifeways and cultures which chiefly attract the tourist (Cohen, 1972).

Secondly, in contrast to the pilgrim, the experience-oriented tourist, even if he observes the authentic life of others, remains aware of their ‘otherness’, which persists even after his visit; he is not ‘converted’ to their life, nor does he accept their authentic lifeways. The pilgrim senses spiritual kinship with even a geographically remote centre: the ‘experiential’ tourist remains a stranger even when living among the people whose ‘authentic’ life he observes, and learns to appreciate, aesthetically. The pilgrim’s experience is ‘existential’: he participates in, partakes of and is united with his co-religionists in the communitas created by the sacredness of the centre (Turner, 1973). He is fully involved in and committed to the beliefs and values symbolized by the centre. MacCannell’s tourist, however, experiences only vicariously the authenticity of the life of others, but does not appropriate it for himself. Hence, though his quest may be essentially religious, the actual experience is primarily aesthetic, owing to its vicarious nature. The aesthetic provoked by direct contact with the authenticity of others may reassure and uplift the tourist, but does not provide a new meaning and guidance to his life. This can best be seen where ‘experiential’ tourists observe pilgrims at a pilgrimage centre: the pilgrims experience the sacredness of the centre; the tourists may experience aesthetically the authenticity of the pilgrims’ experience. The ‘experiential’ mode of tourism, though more profound than the ‘recreational’ or ‘diversionary’, does not generate ‘real’ religious experiences.

MacCannell provides the clues for an analysis of the search for new meaning through tourism. But his work falls short of accomplishing that task; an extension of his approach leads to the distinction of still more profound modes of touristic experiences, and to the eventual closure of the gap separating the mode of experience of the modern mass tourist from that of the traditional pilgrim.
4. *Experimental Mode:* this mode of the touristic experience is characteristic of people who do not adhere any more to the spiritual centre of their own society, but engage in a quest for an alternative in many different directions. It is congenial to the more thoughtful among the disoriented post-modern travellers, particularly the more serious of the ‘drifters’ (Cohen, 1973), who, endowed with a ‘decentralized personality’ (Kavolis, 1970: 438-9) and lacking clearly defined priorities and ultimate commitments, are pre-disposed to try out alternative life-ways in their quest for meaning. Travel is not the only possible form of their quest; mysticism, drugs etc., may serve as alternative paths to the same goal; indeed. Eliade considers that the internal and external quests for the centre are homologous (Eliade, 1971: 18). But for those who do travel in quest of an alternative spiritual centre, travel takes up a new and heightened significance. While the traveller in the ‘experiential’ mode derives enjoyment and reassurance from the fact that others live authentically, while he remains ‘disinherited’ (Heller, 1961) and content merely to observe the authentic life of others, the traveller in the ‘experimental’ mode engages in that authentic life, but refuses fully to commit himself to it; rather, he samples and compares the different alternatives, hoping eventually to discover one which will suit his particular needs and desires. In a sense, the ‘experimental’ tourist is in ‘search of himself’, insofar as in a trial and error process, he seeks to discover that form of life which elicits a resonance in himself; he is often not really aware of what he seeks, of his ‘real’ needs and desires. His is an essentially religious quest, but diffuse and without a clearly set goal.

Examples of such seekers who experiment with alternative lifeways abound among the younger, post-modern set of travellers: urban American, European or Australian youngsters who taste life in farming communities, the Israeli kibbutzim, the Indian ashrams, remote Pacific villages and hippie communes, engage in the experimental mode of tourism. An enlightening example is a short story, apparently written by a foreign student, in an Israeli student paper, entitled ‘In search of in search of . . .’ (Coven, 1971), which commences: ‘I was in search of religion. I was in the depths, the bitter waters. No future, no meaning, loneliness, and boredom. I wanted religion, any religion’ (ibid.: 22); after describing several attempts to find religion in different Christian and Jewish settings in Israel, the story ends inconclusively: the search goes on . . .

Indeed, in extreme cases the search itself may become a way of life, and the traveller an eternal seeker. Such may be the case with those ‘drifters’ who get accustomed to move steadily between different peoples and cultures, who through constant wandering completely lose the faculty of making choices, and are unable to commit themselves permanently to anything. If the ‘seeker’ attitude becomes habitual, it excludes the very possibility of that essentially religious ‘leap of faith’, which commitment to a new ‘spiritual’ centre consists of; the habitual seeker cannot be ‘converted’.

5. *Existential Mode:* if the preceding mode of touristic experience characterizes the ‘seeker’, the ‘existential’ mode in its extreme form is characteristic of the traveller
who is fully committed to an 'elective' spiritual centre, i.e. one external to the mainstream of his native society and culture. The acceptance of such a centre comes phenomenologically closest to a religious conversion, to 'switching worlds', in Berger and Luckmann's (1966: 144) terminology, though the content of the symbols and values so accepted need not be 'religious' in the narrow sense of the term. The person who encounters in his visit to an Israeli kibbutz a full realization of his quest for human communion; the seeker who achieved enlightenment in an Indian aśrama; the traveller who finds in the life of a remote Pacific atoll the fulfilment of his cravings for simplicity and closeness to nature; all these are examples of 'existential' touristic experiences.

For the person attached to an 'elective' external centre, life away from it is, as it were, living in 'exile'; the only meaningful 'real' life is at the centre. The experience of life at the centre during his visits sustains the traveller in his daily life in 'exile', in the same sense in which the pilgrim derives new spiritual strength, is 're-created', by his pilgrimage.

Those most deeply committed to a new 'spiritual' centre may attach themselves permanently to it and start a new life there by 'submitting' themselves completely to the culture or society based on an orientation to that centre: they will desire to 'go native' and to become, respectively, Hindu recluses, Israeli kibbutz members, Pacific islanders, etc.

However, what makes 'existential' experiences a touristic phenomenon is the fact that there are many people — and their number is increasing in a growingly mobile world — who, for a variety of practical reasons, will not be able or willing to move permanently to their 'elective' centre, but will live in two worlds: the world of their everyday life, where they follow their practical pursuits, but which for them is devoid of deeper meaning; and the world of their 'elective' centre, to which they will depart on periodical pilgrimages to derive spiritual sustenance. Thus, e.g. there are some non-Jewish tourists who every year return to live for a few months on a kibbutz, while spending the rest of the year in their home country.

The visit to his centre of the tourist travelling in the existential mode is phenomenologically analogous to a pilgrimage. Indeed, Turner (1973: 193-4) refers to the community of pilgrims as an 'existential communitas'. In terms of the relationship of their existential quest to the culture of their society of origin, traditional pilgrimage and 'existential' tourism represent two extreme configurations: the traditional religious pilgrimage is a sacred journey to a centre which, though geographically 'ex-centric' is still the centre of the pilgrim's religion; it is the charismatic centre from which the pilgrim's life derives meaning, the spiritual centre of his society. Hence, though living away from the centre, the pilgrim is not living in 'exile'. His world and daily abode is hallowed, or given meaning through the centre. The centre, however, is given; it is not elective, not a matter of choice.

The centre of the 'existential' tourist, however, is not the centre of his culture of origin; it is an 'elective' centre, one which he chose and 'converted' to. Hence, it is not only ex-centric to his daily abode, but beyond the boundaries of the world of
his daily existence; it does not hallow his world; hence, he lives in 'exile'. His pilgrimage is not one from the mere periphery of a religious world toward its centre; it is a journey from chaos into another cosmos, from meaninglessness to authentic existence.

Between these two extremes, the pilgrimage to a traditionally given centre and to an 'elective' one, different intermediate types can be discerned. There exist other than purely religious traditional centres of pilgrimage – such as cultural, aesthetic (artistic or natural) or national ones. Visits to the great artistic centres of the past, the heritage of one's own culture, such as were included, e.g. in the Grand Tour (Lambert (ed.), 1935, Trease, 1967), or any visit by people of 'Western' culture to the sites of classical antiquity may take on the quality of cultural pilgrimages. Visits to the shrines of the civil religion (Bellah, 1967), such as the Capitol or the Lincoln Monument by U.S. citizens, or those of the official state religion, e.g. Lenin's Tomb by Soviet citizens (MacCannell, 1976: 85) are forms of political pilgrimage. A person's culture may include, in addition to the religious any number of primary and secondary cultural, aesthetic and national centres, visits to which may be conducted in the existential mode of pilgrimages. Indeed, in the complexities of the modern world, the 'world' of any given culture and society is not clearly bounded; the cultural inheritance of one society is often appropriated by, and made part of other cultures. Many Westerners consider the centres of the ancient Greek or Hebrew cultures as part of 'their' tradition. Hence, what is today an 'elective' centre of a few individuals, outside the confines of their culture of origin, may tomorrow be appropriated by that culture; centres are 'traditional' or 'elective' only relatively to a given point in history.

We spoke of the 'existential' tourist as one who adheres to an 'elective' centre. Such a centre may be completely extraneous to his culture of origin, the history of his society or his biography. But it may also be a traditional centre to which he, his forebears or his 'people' had been attached in the past, but become alienated from. In this case, the desire for a visit to such a centre derives from a desire to find one's spiritual roots. The visit takes on the quality of a home-coming to a historical home. Such travellers, so to speak, re-elect their traditional centre. This conception is perhaps most clearly articulated in the ideology of Zionism. The full realization of the Zionist ideal is 'aliyah', literally 'ascension', the essentially religious term used to describe the act of permanent migration of a Zionist Jew to Israel.

Many Zionists, however, though Israel is their centre, do not take the ultimate step of 'Aliyah'. Their commitment to the 'centre' is expressed in a variety of less radical forms of behaviour, one of which are repeated sojourns in Israel, differing in content, frequency and length: periods of study and volunteer work on kibbutz settlements, yearly visits as private persons or in groups organized by different Zionist organizations, or eventual retirement to Israel, etc. All of these are, in various degrees, forms of 'tourism' (Cohen, 1974). Particularly those who return yearly for relatively short visits for no other reason but to live for a while in Israel, exemplify the 'existential' mode of tourism, in the form of a renewed relationship to a historical centre.
It is interesting to note that recently, the motivation for 'existential' tourism to Israel has apparently widened to include not only Zionists in the narrow sense, but also Diaspora Jews who desire to taste 'genuine' Jewish communal life: the borderline between these and Jews who come for religious reasons, i.e. pilgrims in the narrower traditional religious sense has thus become blurred. Even people who are not pilgrims in any sense, may be overcome by an 'existential' experience at the centre. This comes through powerfully from a recent review of S. Bellow's book To Jerusalem and Back: "The most saline of American writers finds himself unable to escape the tenebrous undertow of Jewish mysticism. 'My inclination is to resist imagination when it operates in this way' he writes. 'Yet I, too, feel that the light of Jerusalem has purifying powers and filters the blood and the thought. I don't forbid myself the reflection that light might be the outer garment of God'" (Time, 1976: 62).

A craving for an existential experience at one's historical sources probably motivates many old-time immigrants - and their progeny - who travel from their country of abode to visit the 'old country', from which they or their parents once departed: e.g. the American Italians or Irish visiting Italy or Ireland, the Corsicans in France visiting Corsica, the American Chinese visiting pre-Communist mainland China etc. Perhaps the most interesting recent example of the sudden awakening of such cravings among a long-exiled people is the renewed interest of American blacks in Africa as the land of their fathers (Spiegel, 1973). Though I have to add, a point to be discussed more fully below, that the mere desire for such an experience is not a guarantee for its fulfilment as many American blacks who visited Africa, and for that matter Jews who visited Israel, learned to their sorrow.

The various modes of tourist experience were here presented in an ascending order from the most 'superficial' one motivated by the desire for mere 'pleasure', to that most 'profound', motivated by the quest for meaning. The modes were separated for analytic purposes: any individual tourist may experience several modes on a single trip; a change from one mode to another may also occur in the 'touristic biography' of any individual traveller. The mix of modes characteristic of different types of trips and the changes in the desired modes of experiences during a person's 'touristic biography' are empirical problems for further investigation.

One particular conceptual problem, however, remains to be clarified: the problem of 'multiple centres'. We have throughout proceeded on the tacit assumption that the individual adheres to only one principal 'spiritual' centre. If he is alienated from the centre of his society or culture, he may look for it elsewhere.

This, however, is an over-simplification, which needs two qualifications: first, some people, we may call them 'humanists', entertain extremely broad conceptions of 'their' culture and are willing to subsume under it everything, or almost everything human, on the principle of Goethe's famous statement 'Nichts Menschliches ist mir fern' ('Nothing human is alien to me'). For such people, there is no single principal 'spiritual' centre: every culture is a form in which the human spirit is manifested. They may thus travel in the experiential, or even existential modes, without being alienated from their culture of origin; for them, the culture
TOURIST EXPERIENCES

they happen to have been reared in, is just one of the many equally valid cultures. The narrower the scope of cultures given equal status, the closer the 'humanist' comes to a 'cultural' tourist. The more important an external centre becomes relative to his culture of origin, the closer he approximates the 'existential' tourist.

Secondly, there are people, we may call them 'dualists' or more broadly 'pluralists', who adhere simultaneously to two or more heterogeneous 'spiritual' centres, each giving rise to equally authentic, though different, forms of life. Such persons may feel equally at home in two or more 'worlds', and even enjoy 'existential' experiences from their sojourn at another centre or centres, without being alienated from their own. American Zionists, for example, must not necessarily feel in 'exile' in the United States, but may adhere simultaneously to the 'American Dream' and to Israel as the Zionist centre, and be equally committed to both.

'Humanists' and 'dualists' or 'pluralists' qualify the underlying hypothesis of this paper, that a person seeks and ultimately adheres to 'spiritual' centres of others only after he realizes the discomfort of his alienation to the centre of his own culture and society. They indicate the necessity for a more thorough phenomenological investigation of the variety of complex world-views which developed in the modern world, for the analysis of which Eliade's or Shils' basic models do not suffice any more.

Conclusions

The typology of modes of tourist experience presented above reconciles the opposing views of 'the tourist' in the current polemic on tourism and thereby prepares the way for a more systematic comparative study of touristic phenomena. Our discussion shows that, depending on the mode of the touristic experience, tourism spans the range of motivations between the desire for mere pleasure characteristic of the sphere of 'leisure' and the quest for meaning and authenticity, characteristic of the sphere of 'religion'; it can hence be approached from both, the perspective of the 'sociology of leisure' as well as that of the 'sociology of religion'. But neither of these approaches will exhaust the whole phenomenon, owing to the differences in the modes of experiences desired by different tourists. The context within which the typology has been developed was borrowed from the sociology of religion: my point of departure was a tourist's fundamental world-view, and specifically, his adherence to, or quest for a 'spiritual' centre. I assumed that different world-views are conducive to different modes of the touristic experience. In fact I tackled the same problem which MacCannell addressed himself to, but, instead of assuming that all tourists are 'pilgrims', I attempted to answer the question, under what conditions and in what sense tourism becomes a form of pilgrimage? It now remains to work out some of the implications of the typology developed in response to this question.

By claiming that tourists pursue different modes of experience, we did not imply that these are invariably realized in their trip. Two problems can be discerned here:
first, from the viewpoint of the tourist, what are the chances of realization of the different modes of touristic experience? Second, from the point of view of the external observer, what are the possibilities of falsification of such experiences by the tourist establishment? Again, I raise questions which MacCannell has been concerned with, but my answers are somewhat different.

While MacCannell takes a lofty view of the desires of the tourists, and a pessimistic view of their realizability, I claim that the various modes of touristic experiences differ in the ease of their realization; generally speaking, the more ‘profound’ the mode of experience, the harder it becomes to realize it. The ‘diversionary’ mode is the easiest to realize: as with any kind of entertainment, it suffices if the travel experience has been pleasurable. The realization of the ‘recreational’ mode demands, in addition, that the experience perform a restorative function for the individual. Since the traveller in these two modes has no pretensions for authenticity, his experience cannot be falsified. He can achieve his aim even when he is fully aware that his experience was staged in a ‘tourist space’. As in other forms of entertainment, there is no need fully to camouflage the staging. The art of the tourist ‘producer’ is to create in the tourist a semi-conscious illusion, and to engage his imagination until he is turned into a willing accomplice, rather than a stooge, of the game of touristic make-believe. The tourist and the touristic entrepreneur may agree that they deal in contrivances; indeed, the fact that these are contrivances often ensures their enjoyability. Insofar as much of what tourists around the world come in touch with in their sightseeing tours, e.g. on visits to ‘native villages’, or at performances of ‘folkloristic dances and ceremonies’ becomes explicitly defined as entertainment, rather than authentic culture, no falsification of the experience of the unpretentious ‘diversionary’ or ‘recreational’ tourist is involved.

The situation is completely different for tourists travelling in the other modes of touristic experience; for them, the authenticity of the experience is crucial for its meaning. This is true not only for the ‘experiential’ tourist, who is reassured by the authentic life of others, and for whom authenticity is obviously a sine qua non for the realization of his experience. It is equally true for the ‘experimental’ and ‘experiential’ tourist: one can hardly experiment with alternative ways of life if these are merely contrived for one’s convenience, nor can one derive existential meaning from a ‘spiritual centre’ outside one’s society or culture, if such a centre is only a chimera, advertised to lure tourists in quest of existential experiences. No wonder that MacCannell, who discusses mainly what we termed ‘experiential’ tourism, emphasizes that the tourist constantly faces the danger of a ‘false’ (touristic) consciousness’, by becoming the victim of the machinations of the touristic establishment, which presents him with a...false back [which] is more insidious and dangerous than a false front; [hence] an inauthentic demystification of social life [of the hosts] is not merely a lie but a superlie, the kind that drips with sincerity’ (MacCannell, 1973: 599). In MacCannell’s view, the prevalent fate of tourists is to become entrapped in ‘tourist space’, never able to realize their craving for authenticity: ‘... there is no way out for them so long as they press their search for
authenticity' (MacCannell, 1973: 601). This claim attains with MacCannell almost the status of a 'touristic condition' reflecting a generally absurd human condition captured in works of existentialist philosophers. If for Sartre, there is 'No Exit' from the human existence and no way to penetrate the subjectivity of others, for MacCannell there is no way for the tourist to penetrate the others' authenticity. Taken to its extreme, the quest of MacCannell's tourist, like that of Camus's or Sartre's heroes, is absurd.

I do not subscribe to this view and believe that at least some modern tourists, particularly the explorer and the original drifter (Cohen, 1972, 1973) are capable of penetrating beyond the staged 'tourist space' and its false backs and observe other people's life 'as it really is'. But this demands an effort and application, and a degree of sophistication which most tourists do not possess. There is hence a high chance that any of those tourists who desire authenticity, will be misled by the tourist establishment, and their experience will be falsified; as long as they do not grasp the falsification, they may labour under the illusion that they have realized their aim; if and when they penetrate the deception, they will be both enlightened and disenchanted; their resentment will give rise to demands for 'honesty in tourism'.

The mechanisms which support the constitution of the touristic illusion and the processes of its denouement have yet to be studied in detail. Such a study would, in MacCannell's neo-Marxist terminology, represent the examination of the processes through which 'false (touristic) consciousness' is created and those through which '(touristic) class consciousness' emerges. MacCannell has done some pioneering work in this field, but much more systematic study is needed.

The tourist travelling in the experimental mode also faces the problem of authenticity. The danger of delusion will be less serious in his case, since his desire to experiment with other forms of life and not just experience them, leads him off the beaten track and sharpens his critical faculties. Being inquisitive and uncommitted, he is tuned to discover deception. His major problem, however, is to achieve commitment to any of the life ways with which he experiments. What originally appears as experimentation with a view to an ultimate commitment to one of the alternatives, may turn into a predicament. An 'experimental' tourist with a decentralized personality, may easily become an 'eternal seeker'. If false consciousness is the danger faced by the 'experiential' tourist, total disorientation, and ultimate alienation from all human society, is the threat to the 'experimental' tourist. The fate of some modern drifters strongly supports this argument.

The tourist travelling in the existential mode faces the most serious problem of realization. Commitment to and authenticity of the experience of the 'elective' centre are not enough; the ultimate problem is that of 'commensurability': is the 'true' life at the centre indeed commensurable to his high hopes and expectations? Does it enable the traveller to live authentically, to achieve self-realization? This is a problem which existential tourists share with pilgrims. The centre, of course, symbolises an ideal. Ideals are not fully realizable, but can only be approached 'asymptotically'. The geographical centre symbolizes the ideal one; between the two, however, there is necessarily a discrepancy: Jerusalem may be the Holy City,
but ordinary human life in Jerusalem is far from holy. The pilgrim or the existential tourist 'ascends' spiritually to the ideal centre, but he necessarily arrives at the geographical one. How does he handle the discrepancy? For example: a person adhering to the ideal of voluntary collectivism, may go to live on a kibbutz, as an 'elective' centre embodying his ideals; soon, however, he will realize that life on the kibbutz is far from ideal. He will thus encounter a discrepancy between the ideal conception and actual life, which, if not dealt with satisfactorily, may provoke a personal crisis of meaninglessness, futility and disenchantment.

I distinguish three kinds of 'existential' tourists in terms of the manner in which they deal with the perceived discrepancy:

(a) 'Realistic idealists', who are willing to concede that even the most ideal place, society or culture have shortcomings, and are thus able to achieve self-realization at the centre without deluding themselves of its faultlessness. I suggest that these are often people who became committed to their 'elective' centre after a prolonged quest and experimentatation, and are thus bereft of illusions.

(b) 'Starry-eyed idealists', those 'true believers' (Hoffer, 1952) who will see perfection in whatever they find at the centre and refuse to face the reality of life in it, inclusive of its shortcomings. From the point of view of the external observer, their self-realization will be based on self-delusion. I suggest that these are often people whose commitment to an 'elective' centre was a result of a sudden conversion, of a precipitous 'switching of worlds' in the certainty of discovery of a panacea.

(c) Finally, there are the 'critical idealists' who oscillate between a craving for the centre from afar, and a disenchantment when they visit it. They are attached to the ideal which the centre is meant to represent, but reject the reality they found at it. For these, the centre has meaning when they are remote, but tends to lose it when they approach it. Their attitude has been forcefully expressed by the Jewish writer Elie Wiesel, at a Conference on Jewish Intellectuals in New York in 1971: 'I am at home in Jerusalem when I am not there'. I suggest that the 'critical idealists' tend to be people who adhered to the centre for a long time from afar, and for whom the trip was a realization of a long-cherished dream. They may preserve their dream, while denying the adequacy of its earthly embodiment, and advocating a reform of the actual centre to bring it closer to the ideal.

The problem of discrepancies, however, can be 'resolved' in another way - at the expense of the authenticity of the tourist's experience, i.e. by straightforward falsification. As demand for existential experiences increases, the tourist establishment and other bodies may set out to supply it. The existential mode of the tourist experience, based as it often is on a prior commitment, is particularly amenable to falsification. The tourist, expecting the ideal life at the centre, is easily taken in; he is helped, as it were, to become a 'starry-eyed idealist'. Like traditional pilgrimage centres, centres of 'existential' tourism are advertised and embellished; tours through 'existential tourist space', like traditional pilgrimages, are staged.
New centres may even be straightforwardly invented. The purveyance of existential experiences becomes big business. Tourist-oriented centres of Eastern religion, catering for ‘instant enlightenment’ may be one example.14 Another are the massive ‘Zionist pilgrimages’ staged by the Israeli governmental and national institutions, in which the visitors are brought to a pitch of Zionist ecstasy at the height of a well-planned and organized tour through staged ‘Zionist tourist space’. The largest of these pilgrimages, equal in everything to its religious counterpart, was the massive United Jewish Appeal ‘This Year in Jerusalem’ tour of 1976, which brought several thousand people to the country and large contributions to the U.J.A. The study of staging the ‘existential’ touristic sites and tours, such as the U.J.A. pilgrimages, is just commencing, but promises rich and interesting data for comparison with traditional religious pilgrimages.15

One last word on the relationship between the modes of touristic experiences and the problem of strangeness. It is generally assumed that tourists, when leaving their familiar environment, expose themselves to increasing degrees of strangeness, against which the more routine, less adventurous mass tourists are protected by an ‘ecological bubble of their home environment’ (Cohen, 1972: 171), so as not to suffer a disorienting culture shock which would spoil the pleasure of their trip. This argument is based on a tacit assumption that the tourist, adhering to the ‘spiritual centre’ of his own society or culture, prefers its lifeways and thought-patterns, and feels threatened and incommoded when presented with the different, unfamiliar ones of the host country. Strangeness, however, may be not only a threat, but also a lure and challenge (Cohen, in preparation (a)). This seems particularly true for those travellers for whom the above assumption does not hold and who have either lost their ‘centre’ and travel in the experiential or experimental mode, or adhere to a new ‘elective’ one outside their society (existential mode). Such travellers may well desire exposure to strangeness and not shun it, but rather seek to ‘submit’ to it. Unlike the mass tourist, they will not suffer from a culture shock when exposed to the host environment, but may rather experience what Meintel (1973: 52) calls a ‘reverse culture shock’ upon return home. Talking of the personal experience of (particularly post-modern) anthropologists, Meintel observes: ‘Desirable values, ... which were not experienced before and which may have been attained as a stranger in a foreign setting may appear unrealizable in the home situation. Nash attributes the fact that ‘many anthropologists come alive only when a field trip is in prospect for them’ to the attractions of the stranger role (Nash, 1963: 163), but perhaps, desirable personal ends attained to a significant degree elsewhere are actually unattainable in the situations to which these individuals return’. (Meintel, 1973: 53). Her observation may well apply to ‘existential’ tourists as well, provided that they succeeded in realizing the desired experiences. The problem of such travellers is, however, that being the most committed and nurturing the highest expectations, they may indeed experience a ‘shock’ upon arrival at their ‘elective’ centre – but not one emanating from the contrast between home and their ‘elected’ external centre, but rather from the fact that this ‘centre’ is too much like home and hence does not correspond to their idealized image.
The phenomenological analysis of tourist experiences in this paper has been highly speculative: contrary to other areas in the study of tourism, the in-depth study of tourist experiences is not yet much developed, though an endless number of surveys of tourist 'motivations' has been conducted. I hope that the conceptual framework and the typology here proposed, will serve as the theoretical baseline for more profound, empirical studies of tourist experiences.\(^6\)

Notes

1. The collection of material on which this paper is based was facilitated by a grant of the Basic Research Unit of the Israel National Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Thanks are due to the Academy for its support and to Dr. J. Dolgin and J. Michalowicz for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

2. Definitions of the concept 'tourist' abound in the literature. 'Travelling for pleasure' is the most commonly evoked dimension of the phenomenon; for additional dimensions necessary for a systematic definition of the tourist as a traveller role, see Cohen, 1974. The present paper departs on a different track - it does not deal with the tourist's role, but with the precise nature of his supposedly 'pleasurable' experience.

3. Cf. e.g. Gross, 1961: 5: 'In the area of tension management, the cathartic and restorative functions of leisure are pre-eminent, . . .'

4. If the experience were available within the life-space, there would be no need to take the trouble to travel; cf. Stouffer, 1950.

5. 'Paradisiac cults' are predicated on the belief that paradise, i.e. the centre, is a place which can be approached by an actual voyage, though that voyage may include miraculous elements (e.g. men flying over the sea, Eliade, 1969: 101-104); if it is believed that the centre is located on a wholly different sphere, it will be approachable by a 'spiritual journey', such as that of the shaman (Rasmussen, 1972), in which a man is miraculously transported to other spheres without actual physical movement through empirical space.

6. This is evidenced by the recurrent use of paradisiac imagery in modern mass tourism (see e.g. Turner and Ash, 1975: 149 ff). But the 'paradise' these tourists seek is of a stereotyped, commercialized kind - it is an idyllic place equipped with all modern amenities. For a discussion of 'paradise' as a 'type of touristic community' see MacCannell, 1976: 183. For an example of the process of debasement of the paradisiac image, see Cohen (in preparation, (b)).

7. An excellent example, in which the game of make-believe has been brought almost to the level of a fine art is mass tourism in Hawaii. Thus Crampon describes a three-stage game through which the 'royal visitor to the Islands' (i.e. the tourist) becomes a Hawaiian; at the end of this process, the tourist comes to like Hawaii, since the Hawaiian kama'aina likes Hawaii. Crampon claims that 'Probably . . . this visitor is not "acting". He does like Hawaii. He is convinced that Hawaii is a Paradise' (Crampon, n.d.: 54). The game has terminated in successful self-delusion, with the full cooperation of the tourist.

8. For MacCannell's definition of 'experience' in the sense here used, see MacCannell, 1976: 23; for some concrete examples of touristic 'experiences' see ibid.: 97.

9. This point is admirably illustrated in an anecdote told by Eliade of the famous German historian Th. Mommsen. After a lecture in which Mommsen gave by heart a detailed account of the topography of ancient Athens, a valet had to take him home, since ' . . . the famous historian did not know how to go home alone. The greatest living authority
on fifth-century Athens was completely lost in his own city of Wilhelminian Berlin' (Eliade, 1976: 19). Eliade continues: 'Mommsen admirabley illustrates the existential meaning of 'living in one’s own world'. His real world, the only one which was relevant and meaningful, was the classical Greco-Roman world. For Mommsen, the world of the Greeks and Romans was not simple history... it was his world – that place where he could move, think and enjoy the beatitude of being alive and creative... Like most creative scholars, he probably lived in two worlds: the universe of forms and values, to the understanding of which he dedicated his life and which corresponds somehow to the 'cosmicized' and therefore 'sacred' world of the primitives, and the everyday 'profane' world into which he was 'thrown' as Heidegger would say. Mommsen obviously felt detached from the profane, non-essential, and for him meaningless and ultimately chaotic space of modern Berlin' (ibid. 19). While the historian Mommsen’s ‘real’ world was remote in time, the existential tourist’s real world is remote in space; but the cognitive structure of their respective worlds is otherwise identical.

10. On the concept of 'submission', as a voluntary form of transition from strangeness to familiarity, see Cohen (in preparation (a)).

11. I intend to deal in a separate paper with the different forms of temporary migration of Jews to Israel which recently proliferated, and through which the boundary between Israeli Jews and Jews of the Diaspora became progressively blurred.

12. This idea has been mostly fully developed in the work of the philosopher E. Bloch; most pertinent for our purposes is his discussion of ‘geographical utopias’ (Bloch, 1959: 873-929). I am grateful to Dr. Paul Mendes-Flohr who introduced me to Bloch’s ideas.

13. Reported to me by Paul Mendes-Flohr.

14. An excellent example is the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh Ashram in Poona, visited primarily by Westerners. Rajneesh, who ‘... speeds up the usually slow Hindu attainment of meditation and bliss with a sort of pop-Hinduism...’, argues that ‘“Westerners want things quickly, so we give it to them right away...”’ (Bangkok Post, 1978: 7).

15. I am obliged for the information on the U.J.A. to Dr. Janet O’Dea, who currently studies the U.J.A. ‘pilgrimages’ to Israel.

16. Accepted 10.1.78.

References


Biographical note: ERIK COHEN is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Born in 1932 he earned his Ph.D. at the Hebrew University. He has done research in Urban Anthropology and Sociology, and the Sociology of Collective Settlements, Tourism, Strangers, Religion, and Ethnic Relations.